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I. INTRODUCTION
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, Mattel’s Barbie, and the Perfect
10 website share several characteristics. The famous literary character, the
iconic doll, and the adult website are each protected by copyright, their
copyright owners have been litigious, and each has been involved in an
infringement suit that resulted in the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party.1 These fee awards served similar purposes, such as deterring frivolous
infringement claims and compensation for warding off those claims. The
courts, however, relied on different sources of authority to justify the awards;
the Sherlock Holmes and Perfect 10 decisions turned to the Copyright Act’s
provision on attorney’s fees, 17 U.S.C. § 505,2 while the court in the Barbie
litigation turned to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 The courts
might also have supported the fee awards by turning to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 under
which a court may require an attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplies a proceeding to personally satisfy attorney’s fees.4 Another option,
albeit rarely invoked, is to rely on their inherent equitable powers.5

1 In the Barbie litigation, the copyright owner, Mattel, recovered the fees from plaintiff’s
counsel while the Perfect 10 website and the Doyle Estate were on the losing side. See, e.g.,
Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002); Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd., 761
F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2014); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54063 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 24, 2015).
2 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (providing that reasonable fees may be awarded to the prevailing party).
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2), (4) (authorizing the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction).
4
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015)
(holding defendants’ copyright infringement counterclaim to be without merit but the case was
remanded so the trial court could calculate the fee award while considering whether a defendant’s
misconduct was akin to bad faith).
5 See, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declaratory
judgment action; defendant’s fraudulent submissions and intentional bad faith warrants an award
of $50,000 in attorney’s fees as a sanction under the court’s inherent authority); Eastway Const.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that a court can turn to its
inherent equitable powers or Rule 11 to support an award of attorney’s fees “[a]part from the
statutory provisions allowing for the shifting of litigation costs . . .”). See also infra notes 101–20
and accompanying text. There is overlap between Rule 11, section 1927 and a federal court’s
inherent power to sanction. Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On – Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs
Beware: Rule 11 Vis-à-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645,
655 (2004).
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.6 resolved “an interesting disagreement” over when it is appropriate to award
attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant under Section 505 of the Copyright
Act7 and ended a perceived ‘venue advantage’ for losing plaintiffs in some
jurisdictions.8 The Court ruled unanimously in Kirtsaeng that courts correctly
give substantial weight to the question of whether the losing side had a
reasonable case to fight, but that the objective reasonableness of the losing
side’s position does not give rise to a presumption against fee shifting. It said
that other factors should also be taken into account, beyond the reasonableness
of litigating positions, when a court exercises its discretion to award fees under
the Copyright Act.9 This decision underscores that the courts have broad
discretion in making fee awards.10 This Article will touch on some aspects of
the Kirtsaeng attorney’s fees decision; but focuses primarily on alternative bases
for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in copyright infringement
cases: Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and a federal court’s inherent equitable powers.
There are scores of reported decisions and considerable commentary on
awarding fees to prevailing defendants under the Copyright Act, and many of
the cases awarding fees emphasize that the losing party pursued the claim in bad
faith, that the claim was frivolous or objectively unreasonable, that the losing
party delayed a hearing on the merits in order to run up the opposing party’s
costs, or that the losing party had no reasonable grounds for the position it took
during the litigation.11 Although there are fewer reported decisions where Rule
11, Section 1927, or inherent authority were used to justify awarding fees to a
prevailing defendant, the courts awarding attorney’s fees often describe the
same kind of litigation misconduct which warrants fees under Section 505 of

136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016).
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 946–47 (9th ed. 2013).
8 Cf. Mannatt Phelps & Philips, The Supreme Court Agrees to Review the Standard for
Awarding Attorney’s Fees to a Prevailing Party in Copyright Infringement Suits, AIPLA
Newsstand April 19, 2016; PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 794 (Jan. 22, 2016). The
Second Circuit’s decision is at 605 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2015).
9 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988; Anandashankar Mazumdar, Sup. Ct. Offers Mixed Ruling on
Copyright Legal Fees, Bloomberg BNA IP L. Resources Ctr., 92 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 590 (June 16, 2016); Copyright L. Rep. (CCH), No. 460, at 1–2 (July 19, 2016).
10 Scott Graham, Copyright Fee-Shifting Clarified, NAT’L L.J., June 20, 2016, at 1; Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 460, at 2 (explaining that the Court noted, and the parties agreed, that Section
505 grants courts wide latitude to award fees based on a totality of the circumstances).
11 See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.10[D][1]
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2017). This treatise concludes that blame (culpability) is still a reliable
indicium for the award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 14-218.
6
7
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the Copyright Act.12 In short, in some infringement cases there can be
substantial overlap in the factors pertinent to Rule 11, Section 1927, inherent
authority, and Section 505; the Copyright Act’s fee shifting provision. This
helps explain similarities between the attorney’s fees which may be assessed
under each authority.13
This Article concentrates on analyzing the Rule 11, Section 1927 and
inherent authority decisions in which attorney’s fees were awarded in copyright
infringement actions14 in order to provide some guidance on what constitutes a
frivolous claim, an objectively unreasonable claim, or a claim inconsistent with
the purpose of the Copyright Act. Most importantly, the article explains when
a prevailing defendant might seek sanctions under Rule 11, Section 1927 or
inherent power in lieu of, or in addition to, seeking fees under Section 505 of
the Copyright Act. It first summarizes how Section 505 of the Copyright Act,
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and inherent
authority to sanction have been interpreted and applied to justify awarding
attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants. It then discusses the similarities and
differences between these bases for shifting fees and offers guidance for
selecting a particular basis, or perhaps seeking fees under several bases
simultaneously.15
This Article acknowledges that many cases in which attorney’s fees are
awarded under Section 505 will not support an award of fees under Rule 11,
Section 1927 or inherent authority. It asserts, however, that in those instances

12 The Kirtsaeng decision leaves the award of fees under Section 505 primarily to the trial court’s
discretion and added some guidelines for when fee shifting would be proper including, along with
objective reasonableness as the principal guiding element, the losing party’s litigation misconduct
no matter how reasonable the claim or defense might be, the need to deter repeated instances of
infringement, and the over-aggressive assertion of claims even if the losing party’s position was
reasonable in a particular case. If a party has a legitimate defense to an infringement claim and
acts reasonably in defending itself, it should not pay fees if it loses. On the other hand, a losing
party asserting frivolous and vexatious claims should pay the winning side’s attorney’s fees.
Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988–89; Mazumdar, supra note 9; Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460, at 3.
13 In essence, they often apply to the same kind of conduct. Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc.,
788 F.2d 151, 156–58 (3d Cir. 1986); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir
2015). See also Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“By putting
defendants to the effort and expense of preparing the joint motion for summary judgment,
counsel for the plaintiffs unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings, making an
award of attorney’s fees appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The signing of the joint pre-trial
order was a clear violation of Rule 11 as well.”).
14 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[B][1][d] (noting that copyright litigants
sometimes obtain fees under provisions other than Section 505 of the Copyright Act with the
most prominent being Rule 11).
15 See, e.g., Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156–58.
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in which a court can conclude that a plaintiff’s copyright claim is frivolous or
objectively unreasonable to justify a fee award under Section 505, there might
well be significant overlap with the standard justifications for awarding fees
under Rule 11 and/or Section 1927, and sometimes under inherent authority.
In these ‘overlap’ cases, if the prevailing party and the court want to punish and
deter opposing counsel instead of visiting his or her sins on the plaintiff, then it
would be appropriate to turn to Rule 11 and its provisions on sanctions, or to
28 U.S.C. § 1927, both of which support imposing the fees on counsel, instead
of relying on Section 505 of the Copyright Act, which imposes the fees on the
losing party. Moreover, if the misconduct is serious enough the court might be
able turn to Rule 11, Section 1927 or inherent powers along with Section 505 to
hold the losing counsel and his or her client jointly and severally liable for
attorney’s fees and costs.16
II. AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO ‘PREVAILING’ ALLEGED INFRINGERS
A. THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S FEE SHIFTING PROVISION

Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than
the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.17

16 See, e.g., Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Fharmacy Records
v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008); cf. Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 2016
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,986 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (fee award against the losing plaintiff was
warranted under Section 505 but the losing plaintiff’s counsel was not jointly and severably liable
for the fees because his conduct was not in bad faith). In some circumstances, a lawyer’s license
to practice might be suspended as a result of his or her misconduct during litigation. For
instance, a lawyer’s license to practice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was suspended for
three months and a day after misconduct in copyright infringement claim against Usher. Amanda
Bronstad, Fee Request Turned Aside in Led Zeppelin Copyright Case, LAW.COM, Aug. 9, 2016, http://
www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/08/09/fee-request-turned-aside-in-led-zeppelin-copyright-ca
se/?slreturn=20170105215508.
17 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). Pre-infringement registration of the copyright, or registration within
a three months post-publication grace period, is a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees. 17
U.S.C. § 412 (2012). Note that the attorney’s fees provision in the patent statute provides that
“[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35
U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (emphasis added).
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This fee-shifting statute overcomes the American rule that each party in
litigation pays their own attorney’s fees.18 The statute does not contain a list of
factors a judge should consider in exercising discretion to award fees to the
prevailing party, and Congress did not explain why a fee-shifting provision was
included in the current statute or in the 1909 Copyright Act.19 In any event, fee
awards play a part in making sure all litigants have access to the courts to
vindicate their rights under the Copyright Act: they prevent infringements from
going unchallenged when there is otherwise little economic incentive to litigate,
they penalize the losing party, and they compensate the prevailing party.20 The
fee award is paid by the party; not his or her attorney.21
The Copyright Act’s fee shifting provision restricts awards to the “prevailing
party” but does not provide a definition.22 The Supreme Court helped
somewhat by stating that a prevailing party is one that succeeds “on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit.”23 Notwithstanding the lack of a precise rule for
making fee determinations, courts routinely awarded attorney’s fees to
prevailing plaintiffs.24 However, for many years when the prevailing party was
18 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247–58 (1975);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). In contrast,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that unless otherwise provided by statute, the
prevailing party in a lawsuit shall be awarded its costs. The expenses a court may tax as a cost
under this authority are defined at 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and include fees of the clerk and marshal, fees
for printed or electronically recorded transcript, witness fees, and docket fees.
19 The old law, 17 U.S.C. § 40, provided that “the court may award to the prevailing party a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” There is little legislative history for either of these
fee shifting provisions. Peter Jaszi, 505 And All That – The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107–08 (1992).
20 Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981).
21 Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
22 It is assumed to be self-defining. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[B][3] (noting
that sometimes there is uncertainty about whether a party is the prevailing party even though
section 505 has been interpreted and applied in many decisions).
23 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemore, 581 F.2d
275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 2002)). See also Magder v. Belton Lee, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,809
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that defendant is not a prevailing party when the plaintiff dismisses
without prejudice because the action is not judicially sanctioned, but voluntary, and does not
change the relationship between the parties); EMI Blackwood Music, Inc. v. KTS Karaoke, Inc.,
2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,964 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that defendant whose issuance
carrier paid over $1 million to music publisher to settle infringement claims in exchange for
dismissal of claims with prejudice is not a prevailing party); Wolf v. Travolta, 2016 Copyrightable
L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,923 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (granting no fee award to defendant because success
was based on the statute of limitations defense and not the merits of the copyright).
24 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g
Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2001). See, e.g., Scorpio Music v. Victor Willis, Copyright L.
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the alleged infringer some courts tended to award attorney’s fees only after
determining that the plaintiff brought the action in bad faith or that the claim
was frivolous.25 This difference in approaches presented a dilemma for persons
threatened with a suit, or actually sued. If the defendant had a meritorious
defense to what appeared to be a non-frivolous claim, should the alleged
infringer defend vigorously and possibly have to absorb his or her attorney’s
fees even if he wins, or would it be wiser to settle?26 This more favored
treatment status for prevailing plaintiffs on the recovery of attorney’s fees was
overruled in 1994 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.27
John Fogerty, the lead singer and songwriter for Creedence Clearwater
Revival, allegedly infringed his own song Run Through the Jungle when he wrote
The Old Man Down the Road.28 The jury returned a verdict for Fogerty, and he
sought reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 505. The trial court denied the
motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed explaining that fees were not appropriate
because Fantasy’s suit was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith as required
by the circuit’s ‘dual standard’ for awarding attorney’s fees to successful
defendants.29 Under this standard, successful plaintiffs were treated better than
prevailing defendants.30 The Supreme Court pointed out that “some Courts of
Appeals followed the so-called ‘even-handed’ approach in which no distinction
was made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.”31 The Court
then abolished the dual standard and simultaneously emphasized that the award
of attorney’s fees should not be automatic for any prevailing party in view of
the “may award” language in Section 505.32 It stated:
Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of
enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is
peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,821 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that an award of attorney’s fees is justified to
encourage authors like Willis of the Village People to assert their rights to regain their copyright
interests and to deter production companies from interfering with those rights). See generally
MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 467–68 (5th ed. 2012).
25 LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 467–68.
26 Jaszi, supra note 19, at 109.
27 510 U.S. 517 (1994); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 468.
28 Fogerty wrote Run Through the Jungle in 1970 and sold publishing rights to the predecessor of
Fantasy Records. Fogerty later wrote The Old Man Down the Road which was released and
distributed by Warner Brothers Records. Fantasy sued for infringement alleging that this song
was merely Run Through the Jungle with new words.
29 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521.
30 Id. at 520. The Ninth Circuit’s decision is at 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
31 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521.
32 LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 468.
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demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who
seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses
should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that
plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of
infringement.33
The Court also rejected Fogerty’s argument for adopting the so-called
‘British Rule’ that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded
attorney fees as a matter of course,34 emphasizing that “the court may award a
reasonable attorney’s fee” language in the statute connoted discretion.35 It
explained that Congress could not have intended to adopt the British Rule
given the fact that it “legislates against the strong background of the American
Rule” under which the parties bear their own attorney’s fees unless Congress
provides otherwise.36
In remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit37 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that there was no precise rule or formula to guide a court in
exercising its discretion on awarding fees to a prevailing party, but that
“equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have
previously identified.’ ”38 The Court listed in a footnote some of the factors
courts should consider:
These factors include ‘frivolousness, motivation, objective
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances
to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.’ Lieb
v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (1986). We agree
that such factors may be used to guide courts’ discretion, so long
as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act

33 510 U.S. at 527. The Court said that Fogerty’s successful defense of his song increased
public exposure to a musical work that could lead to further creative pieces. This furthered the
policies of the Copyright Act just as much as a successful infringement claim by a copyright
holder. Id.
34 Id. at 533.
35 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 505).
36 Id. at 533–34.
37 Id. at 534–35. The remand was necessary because Fogerty, as a prevailing defendant, had
been held to a more stringent standard than a prevailing plaintiff.
38 Id. at 534 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436–37 (1983)).
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and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an
evenhanded manner.39
An “interesting disagreement” developed after Fogerty was decided in 199440
over how courts should weigh and apply these nonexclusive factors in deciding
whether to award fees to a prevailing defendant.41 Some circuits said there is a
strong presumption in favor of fees for a meritorious defense or that the grant
of fees is the rule rather than the exception.42 In other circuits, however, a
39 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 & n.19 (1994). On remand the District Court
awarded Fogerty $1.3 million in attorney’s fees even though Fantasy’s infringement suit was not
frivolous or brought in bad faith. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d
553 (9th Cir. 1996). But see 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2016) (authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party in patent litigation in exceptional cases). The Supreme Court recently interpreted
this statute in Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), and made important
changes to how attorney’s fees are to be awarded in patent cases. It rejected a rigid formula for
determining when a case was exceptional that had been used by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and directed courts to exercise full discretion when evaluating whether a case was
exceptional. In a companion case, Highmark v. Allcare Health Management Systems, 134 S. Ct. 1744
(2014), the Court held that the Federal Circuit should no longer exercise de novo review of a
district court’s award of fees under the patent statute. Prior to the Supreme Court’s rulings it was
unlikely for a defendant in a patent case to receive an award of attorney’s fees absent a finding of
inequitable conduct or separately sanctionable litigation misconduct. As a result of these
companion decisions, it should be easier for district courts to shift fees to prevailing alleged
infringers if the court concludes that the litigation was abusive. The emphasis on discretion in
Kirtsaeng is consistent with Supreme Court’s emphasis on discretion in Octane Fitness and Highmark.
40 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 7, at 946–47.
41 The factors also include the degree of success on the claim along with frivolousness,
motivation, objective unreasonableness and considerations of compensation and deterrence. See,
e.g., TufAmerica Inc. v. Michael Diamond, 2016 WL 1565606 (S.D.N.Y 2016) (holding that
plaintiff’s claims were objectively unreasonable and clearly without merit); Gilbert v. New Line
Productions, Inc., 2010 WL 5790688 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 490 F.
App’x 34 (9th Cir. 2012). In determining the amount of the fee courts typically apply the lodestar
approach which multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a
reasonable hourly rate. Andreas Becker, DRYE WIT, In Recent Decisions, New York and California
District Courts Agree that Prevailing Defendants in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Are Entitled to Their
Attorney’s Fees (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.dryewit.com/2016/03/in-recent-decisions-new-yorkand-california-agree-that-prevailing-defendants-in-copyright-infringement-lawsuits-are-entitled-totheir-attorneys-fees/. This blog cites Fogerty and also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)
for the lodestar method of calculating fees. See, e.g., Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. Von Muller, 540
Fed. App’x 103, 107–08 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding for recalculation an award of attorney’s fees
with the district court being told to lay out a quantitative basis in order to calculate the lodestar
properly); Bell v. Lantz, 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,948 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding the fee
award justified but remanding for recalculation of the award based on rate of $250 per hour in
engagement letter instead of $410 per hour as set by the court).
42 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 761 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2014); Thoroughbred Software
Int’l v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 2007).
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prevailing defendant’s request would be denied if the court found that the
plaintiff’s suit was neither frivolous, objectively unreasonable, nor brought in
bad faith; an award of fees was thus unnecessary to promote either
compensation or deterrence.43
The meaning of the Fogerty standard was clarified in 2016 when the Supreme
Court decided Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons.44 The Second Circuit had rejected
defendant Kirtsaeng’s request that Wiley pay his attorney’s fees after the
Supreme Court ruled in his favor in 2013, saying that his domestic sales of lowpriced textbooks purchased in Asia were protected under the first sale
doctrine.45 The court of appeals concluded that plaintiff Wiley’s unauthorized
distribution claim against Kirtsaeng was neither frivolous, objectively
unreasonable nor brought in bad faith because the Supreme Court had split 4 to
4 on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to the unauthorized sale of
imported goods just a few years earlier in Omega v. Costco.46 In short, Wiley’s
position was objectively reasonable so no award of fees should be made.
Petitioner Kirtsaeng contended that there was a split in the circuits on how
Section 505 is interpreted that results in a venue advantage for losing plaintiffs
in the Second Circuit compared to the Seventh, Ninth and the Eleventh
Circuits; in essence, the outcome of fee award depends on where he was
originally sued.47 For instance, prior to Kirtsaeng there was a strong presumption
43 See, e.g., Guzman v. Hacienda Records and Recording Studio, 2015 WL 4612583 (S.D. Tex.
2015); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182648, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding a claim not objectively unreasonable in light of the Kirtsaeng case). Cf. Williams v.
Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 (2016) (refusing to award the late Marvin Gaye’s
family $3.5 million in attorney’s fees as the prevailing party plaintiff because, among other things,
defendants’ defenses were objectively reasonable and meritorious, and the award of $5.3 million
in actual damages and profits coupled with a 50% running royalty on revenue from defendants’
song Blurred Lines were sufficient to compensate the plaintiffs and deter future infringements).
See also AIPLA Newsstand, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, by Loeb and Loeb, April 12, 2016.
44 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016). See generally Graham, supra note 10, at 1.
45 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). See 91 BNA PTCJ 794 (Jan. 22, 2016). The Second Circuit decision
is at 605 Fed. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2015). The first sale doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
46 The Second Circuit stated that the district court properly placed substantial weight on the
reasonableness of Wiley’s position in this case. It had pursued an objectively reasonable position.
605 Fed. App’x at 49–50. See also Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir.
2008), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (holding that goods lawfully made
overseas are not lawfully made under U.S. copyright laws, and therefore the first sale doctrine
does not limit the importation right for such copies). This interpretation of sections 602, 106(3)
and 109(a) was overruled in the Kirtsaeng decision. See generally CCH Copyright Law Reports No.
460, at 1–2 (summarizing the district court and appellate court decisions).
47 Mannatt Phelps & Phillips, Be Reasonable: The Supreme Court Agrees to Review the Standard for
Awarding Attorney’s Fees to a Prevailing Party in Copyright Infringement Suits, AIPLA NEWSSTAND, Apr.
19, 2016.
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in favor of awarding fees for a meritorious defense in the Seventh Circuit48 and
in the Sixth Circuit the grant of fees under Section 505 was said to be routine—
the rule rather than the exception.49 In essence, he was contending that if Wiley
had sued him in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, his chances of recovering fees
would have been better than having been sued in the Second Circuit. In
addition, Kirtsaeng asserted that courts should weigh whether or not the
litigation resolved an important, close legal issue in a way that clarified copyright
law; if so, an award of fees would be appropriate.50
The Supreme Court held unanimously in Kirtsaeng that among the several
Fogerty factors courts should consider in awarding attorney’s fees under Section
505, they must give substantial weight to the objective reasonableness of the
losing party’s position, but not dispositive weight. It rejected the ‘close case’
factor pushed by Kirtsaeng, emphasized that all the circumstances of the case
must be considered in light of the goals of the Copyright Act, and said that fees
might be appropriate even though the losing party’s position was reasonable. 51
Without intimating that a different conclusion should be reached, the Court
remanded the case for a new hearing on fees because the courts in the Second
Circuit may have made ‘substantial weight’ given to the reasonableness of the
plaintiff’s claim almost dispositive; i.e., if a court determined that the losing
plaintiff’s claim was reasonable, then it followed that fees should not be
shifted.52 On remand, the district court again denied the prevailing defendant’s
request for attorneys’ fees, explaining that Wiley’s claim was objectively
reasonable; a legitimate attempt to enforce its rights.53
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons provides nationwide clarity as to the
appropriate test for awarding attorney’s fees under Section 505 and it resolves
the “interesting disagreement” and perceived “venue advantage” for losing
plaintiffs in some circuits54 by eliminating the presumptions for, or against, fee
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 761 F.3d 781, 791 (7th Cir. 2014).
Thoroughbred Software Int’l v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 2007).
50 Graham, supra note 10, at 4; Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460 at 2-3.
51 AIPLA Newsletter, Copyright Attorney Fee Decisions May Depend on ‘Objective
Reasonableness,’ June 17, 2016, discussing Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979; Graham, supra note 10, at 4;
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460 at 3 (also explaining that Kirtsaeng’s suggested approach was
not as administrable as Wiley’s).
52 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1983; Graham, supra note 10, at 4; Mazumdar, supra note 9; Copyright
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 460 at 4 (the court was to give substantial weight to the reasonableness of
Wiley’s litigating position and also account for other relevant factors).
53 AIPLA Newsstand, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, Jan. 9, 2017.
54 Petition for Certiorari at 30–31, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (No.
15-375). Graham, supra note 10, at 4. At one point in the fall of 2015 the Supreme Court had
four separate petitions asking it to review how lower courts exercised their discretion to award
48
49
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shifting that had developed in different circuits.55 However, notwithstanding
those differences, there was no disagreement among the circuits that an award
of attorney’s fees is appropriate when the trial court found that the plaintiff’s
infringement claim was frivolous, objectively unreasonable or brought in bad
faith.56 In those situations, it might often be possible to justify awarding fees to
the prevailing alleged infringer by turning to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
B. FEE SHIFTING UNDER RULE 11

Attorneys have an ethical obligation to the court to refrain from conduct
that frustrates the aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 states
that “[t]hese rules . . . should be construed, administered, and employed by the
court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”57 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules, which
“governs attorneys’ ethical obligations associated with filing or pursuing a
lawsuit,”58 reinforces this principle by imposing a general duty of candor and
care on litigants and their attorneys by requiring certification of pleadings and
other documents which are filed in a lawsuit. It is a professionalism tool.59 It
provides that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed
by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name.”60 The attorney is
thereby certifying to the court “that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party under section 505. Tony Dutra, Fourth Petition Filed on
Copyright Case Fee Shifting, BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. – DAILY
EDITION (Oct. 15, 2015). The question presented in Kirtsaeng’s petition was: “What is the
appropriate standard for awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party under §505 of the
Copyright Act?” Anandaskankar Mazumdar, Textbook Arbitrager Gets Second Trip to Supreme Court,
91 BNA PTCJ 794 (Jan. 22, 2016). The Supreme Court’s denial of a copyright owner’s petition
for review of a decision requiring him to pay an alleged infringer’s attorney’s fees in Hunn v. Dan
Wilson Homes, Inc., No. 15-431 (December 7, 2015) arguably signaled that the federal courts
should be as willing to award fees to the prevailing party in copyright infringement cases as the
Court held in Octane Fitness for the prevailing defendant in patent cases. Tony Dutra, High Court
Denies Copyright Case Fee Shifting Review, BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. –
DAILY EDITION (Dec. 7, 2015).
55 Graham, supra note 10, at 1 (stating “the decision could make copyright fee awards in the
Second Circuit slightly easier to obtain, it may have the opposite impact in circuits such as the
Fifth and Seventh, which employ a presumption in favor of fee shifting that losing parties must
overcome”).
56 Cf. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 469; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 7, at 946.
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 1; 1993 Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 11.
58 Gianfrancesco v. Laborers Intern. Union Local 594, 2013 WL 2296759, at *2 (D.N.J. 2013).
59 RICHARD FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 379 (3d ed. 2012).
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss1/4

12

Shipley: Discouraging Frivolous Copyright Infringement Claims: Fee Shiftin

2016]

DISCOURAGING FRIVOLOUS COPYRIGHT CLAIMS

45

information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances”61 that the document is not being presented for an improper
purpose, that it has evidentiary support, and is warranted by existing law or a
nonfrivolous argument for changing existing law.62 It imposes a “duty to look
before leaping and may be seen as a litigation version of the familiar railroad
admonition to ‘stop, look and listen.’ ”63 “[W]here it is patently clear that a
claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and
where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse
the law as it stands,” the rule is violated.64
Upon motion or sua sponte, courts may impose sanctions for violations of the
rule’s obligations.65 The sanctions can include awarding the moving party its
reasonable attorney’s fees resulting from the violation.66 The purposes of Rule
11 sanctions include deterrence and compensation.67 An award of attorney’s
fees under the rule is not fee shifting but “a means by which to return to the
status quo the party which incurred legal expenses as a result of an action or

Id. at 11(b).
See FREER, supra note 59, at 381 (discussing the obligations FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)). These
obligations apply with equal force to those defending claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). The
Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1993 revisions state:
Subdivisions (b) and (c). These subdivisions restate the provisions requiring
attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and
facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and
prescribing sanctions for violation of these obligations. The revision in part
expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater
constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule
continues to require litigants to “stop-and-think” before initially making legal or
factual contentions. It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by
subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is
no longer tenable and by generally providing protection against sanctions if they
withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called to their
attention.
63 Gianfrancesco, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73668, at *6 (citing and quoting Lieb v. Topstone
Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986)).
64 See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
that the District Court erred in denying municipal defendant’s motion for fees incurred in
defending a claim that was destined to fail and on remand the court was to impose appropriate
sanctions against the appellant, their counsel, or both).
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1), (c)(3).
66 Id. at 11(c)(4).
67 See Azubuko v. MBNA Am. Bank, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D. Mass. 2005); Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (stating that the rule’s goal is general and specific
deterrence); cf. Hart, supra note 5, at 650 (“The primary purpose of Rule 11, however, remains
deterrence, not compensation.”).
61
62

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2016

13

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

46

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 24:33

motion which ought never have been filed.”68 Nevertheless, it has been noted
that “[a]part from the statutory provisions allowing for the shifting of litigation
costs, a federal court may award attorney’s fees pursuant to its inherent
equitable powers, or pursuant to the dictates of” Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.69
Rule 11 has been revised several times since adoption in 193870 and the
current version, largely unchanged after substantial amendments in 1993, states
that “the court may impose an appropriate sanction”71 and authorizes the
imposition of nonmonetary as well monetary sanctions “limited to what suffices
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.”72 Sanctions are not intended to punish but to deter violations of the
general duty of reasonable care imposed by the rule.73
Motions for sanctions have to be made separately from other motions and
must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates the duties listed in
11(b).74 The motion is to be served on the attorney, law firm or party alleged to
have violated the rule, but it must not be filed with or presented to court until
twenty-one days after service on the alleged violator.75 During this twenty-one
day safe harbor period the alleged violator can withdraw or correct the
challenged document, and if this happens sanctions will not be imposed.76 An
Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 966 (11th Cir. 1987).
Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253.
70 The original version of Rule 11 from 1938 did little to prevent abuses in filing frivolous and
sham pleadings so substantial revisions became effective in 1983. The amendments added an
affirmative requirement that an attorney investigate the bases of a pleading before filing. The
attorney had to certify that the pleading was well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for changing existing law, and that it was not interposed for any
improper purpose. If a pleading did not meet this standard, then the court was required to
impose sanctions which ordinarily were to order the offender to pay the opposing party his or her
expenses, including attorney’s fees. GENE SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING
CIVIL PROCEDURE 217 (3d ed. 2002). However, these revisions generated a dramatic increase in
satellite litigation over sanctions as well as criticism and discontent. Id. at 217–18. FREER, supra
note 59, at 379 (there was a huge amount of satellite sanctions litigation due in large part to the
required sanctions—it was a must/shall Rule); Hart, supra note 5, at 650.
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added). Among other important changes, the revised
Rule abolished the mandatory sanctions which had generated much of the satellite litigation. See
also Hart, supra note 5, at 650.
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). See also SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 70, at 218–19
(explaining generally the changes made by the 1993 revisions to Rule 11).
73 FREER, supra note 59, at 379, 382.
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
75 Id.
76 Id.; FREER, supra note 59, at 381. Failure to comply with the technical requirements of the
safe harbor provision, Rule 11(c)(2), such as service of a motion as opposed to a letter and
68
69
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order imposing sanctions must describe the challenged conduct and explain the
basis for the sanction.77 Monetary sanctions cannot be imposed against a
represented party for violating the obligations in Rule 11(b)(2) that one’s legal
contentions are warranted, but they can be imposed against the party’s firm or
an individual attorney.78
The U.S. Supreme Court has made several important statements about the
interpretation and application of Rule 11 in copyright infringement suits.79 In
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment the trial court directed a verdict in favor
of the defendants against allegations of forgery in a suit for willful copyright
infringement and then, upon defendants’ motion, imposed a sanction of
$100,000 against the plaintiff attorney’s firm because there was no basis in fact
for the allegations, and there had been an insufficient pretrial investigation of
the forgery allegation.80 The law firm moved for relief, arguing that the
sanction should be imposed against the attorney who signed the pleading, not
the firm. The trial court agreed in part and split the sanction between the
attorney and his firm and the Court of Appeals affirmed.81 The Supreme Court
reversed but not because sanctions were inappropriate.82 Rather, it reversed
because the version of Rule 11 in effect at that time stated that in the event of a
violation “the court . . . shall impose upon the person who signed” the pleading
an appropriate sanction.83 The Court said that this language and the rule’s other
references to ‘the signer’ connoted an individual.84 Accordingly, the decision

adhering to the time limits, will ordinarily result in denial of the motion for sanctions. Gal v.
Viacom Int’l, 403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(6); see Gal, 403 F. Supp. at 309 (“It does not seem overly demanding to
require counsel to comply with the clear directives of Rule 11 when seeking sanctions.”).
78 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A) states that “[t]he court must not impose a monetary sanction: (A)
against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2).” Rule 11 does not apply to discovery, FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b)(3), and courts retain inherent power to discipline attorneys and parties even though
Rule 11 usually supersedes these inherent powers in situations where the rule applies. SHREVE &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 70, at 226 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991)).
79 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comms’ns. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991); Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
80 Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 122. See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, at 12–178.
81 Pavelic & LeFlore, 498 U.S. at 122–23. The attorney who signed the documents, Ray LeFlore,
joined Radovan Pavelic in a law partnership well after the action had been commenced. Id. at 122.
82 Id. at 124.
83 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (emphasis added)).
84 Id. The Court later added that the Rule is aimed “not [at] reimbursement but ‘sanction’, and
that the purpose of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility.” Id. at 126. See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, at 12–178.
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was reversed insofar as it allowed the attorney’s fees to be imposed against the
offending lawyer’s firm.85
The 1993 revisions to Rule 11 eliminated the ‘individual signer’ restriction.86
The current version provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law
firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner,
associate, or employee.”87 Incidentally, there was no discussion in Pavelic &
LeFlore of whether the defendant had sought an award of attorney’s fees against
the plaintiff under Section 505 of the Copyright Act in addition to seeking
sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel. After all, the plaintiff lost the forgery claim
on a directed verdict motion, the jury returned a verdict against it on all other
counts, and the court said that there was no basis in fact for the allegations.88
The defendant was a prevailing party, and an award of its attorney’s fees under
Section 505 might have deterred the assertion of this kind of frivolous,
unsupported, and objectively unreasonable claim by copyright holders just as
effectively as the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions deters the filing of frivolous
claims. Nevertheless, the Rule 11 sanctions imposed in this pre-Fogerty decision
sent a strong message to plaintiff’s counsel.89
The Supreme Court made additional pronouncements on Rule 11 in the
context of a copyright infringement claim in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enterprises, Inc.90 which affirmed the award of attorney’s fees under
Rule 11 against the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s law firm for filing an infringement
action based on alleged common errors in the parties’ respective works that were
really correct information.91 The district court conducted its own investigation
into the alleged copying, and determined that almost all the ‘seeds’ in defendant’s
directory alleged to be false were in fact accurate.92 The court then referred the
matter to a Magistrate to determine whether Rule 11 sanctions should be
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 127 (1989).
The Advisory Committee Notes for the 1993 revisions state that the new “provision is
designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule.” Cf. id. at 120 (stating that the 1983
version of Rule 11 does not permit sanctions against law firm of attorney signing groundless
complaint).
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1).
88 Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 122.
89 Of course, Pavelic & LeFlore was decided in 1989, four years before the Supreme Court
decided Fogerty which put prevailing defendants in copyright infringement actions on equal
footing with prevailing plaintiffs for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text.
90 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
91 Id. at 537; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, at 12-179.
92 Bus. Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 536. The trial court had a law clerk spend about an hour calling
the businesses in the ten the plaintiff had listed as the seeds which showed up in the defendant’s
directory. Nine of the ten did not contain false information.
85
86
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imposed. This judge asked the plaintiff and its law firm to explain why nine of
the ten allegations of copying were meritless, expressed doubt that it was mere
coincidence, and recommended that both the law firm and the party be
sanctioned.93 Chromatic, the defendant, filed a motion for sanctions at the
court’s request but soon withdrew it as to the law firm because it had dissolved.
The court accepted this withdrawal and, after stating that the entire suit had no
basis in fact and that there was no evidence of infringement, dismissed the case
with prejudice.94 It imposed $13,865.66 in sanctions against plaintiff Business
Guides.95 The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that Rule 11
imposes on any party who signs a pleading, motion or other
paper—whether the party’s signature is required by the Rule or is
provided voluntarily—an affirmative duty to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing, and
that the applicable standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances.96
The Rule “imposes an objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represented
parties who sign papers or pleadings,”97 and the trial court had found that the
plaintiff had not conducted a reasonable inquiry before submitting the initial
TRO application and before submitting certain signed declarations.98
Here, as in the Supreme Court’s Pavelic & LeFlore decision, there was no
discussion of whether the prevailing defendant sought attorney’s fees under
Section 505 of the Copyright Act against the plaintiff.99 The alleged infringer
was the prevailing party and the plaintiff’s claim was without merit and
objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, an award of fees under Section 505
could have been justified. Such an award would have compensated the
defendant and also served as a deterrent. Of course, an award of fees under the
Copyright Act would have been duplicative of the sanctions imposed under

93 Id. at 539. The District Court judge agreed with the Magistrate and asked Chromatic, the
defendant, to file a motion seeking sanctions.
94 Id. The law firm was Finley Kumble. The court’s rulings were without prejudice to the
defendant’s right to pursue sanctions against the firm at a later date. Id.
95 Id. at 540 (the amount of Chromatic’s legal expenses and out of pocket costs).
96 Id. at 551.
97 Id. at 554.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 551–54 (explaining why Rule 11 was valid under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072).
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Rule 11.100 Nevertheless, under either rationale the fee award would have had
the effect of deterring this kind of frivolous, unsupported claim. In summary,
the kind of litigation misconduct that might result in an award of attorneys’ fees
as a sanction under Rule 11 could also justify fee shifting to the prevailing party
under Section 505 of the Copyright Act.
C. FEE SHIFTING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927 OR INHERENT AUTHORITY

The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 derives from an 1813 statute, and
has provided for the award of attorney’s fees since 1980.101 It states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
Section 1927 is described as a penal statute that deters unnecessary delays in
litigation by requiring attorneys who violate it to personally satisfy costs
associated with their litigation misconduct including attorney’s fees.102 While
Rule 11 focuses on pleadings, motions, and other signed papers, Section 1927
looks at the course of conduct.103 Sanctions are triggered under this statute if
the accused attorney multiplies the proceedings and the attorney’s actions are
both vexatious and unreasonable, or if he or she acted in bad faith.104 It should
be used only when the misconduct evidences a serious “ ‘disregard for the
orderly process of justice.’ ”105 An attorney who knows or, should know, that a
100 Business Guides was also decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Fogerty that put
prevailing defendants on equal footing with prevailing plaintiffs in regard to the award of fees
under section 505.
101 GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 20, at 374–75
(3d ed. 2000); Janet Eve Josselyn, The Song of Sirens – Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 31
B.C. L. REV. 477, 477–78 (1990).
102 JOSEPH, supra note 101, at 374–75; see also Hart, supra note 5, at 651–52 (explaining a court
may hold parties and counsel joint and severally liable for fees under section 1927); see also Royal
Oak Entertainment v. City of Royal Oak, 486 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
103 Hart, supra note 5, at 652 (citing Bowler v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 901 F.
Supp. 597, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
104 Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985).
105 Id. (explaining awards under section 1927 will not be set aside unless the court’s “findings
are clearly erroneous”) (quoting Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.
1968) (cert. denied)).
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claim is frivolous, or that his or her tactics will block litigation of legitimate
claims, may be subject to sanctions under Section 1927.106 However, filing an
objectively unreasonable copyright infringement claim that might result in an
award of fees under Section 505 will not necessarily mean that the claim is so
completely without merit to require the conclusion that it was filed for an
improper purpose under Section 1927.107
Section 1927 could be used in a copyright infringement suit when an award
of fees to the prevailing party under Section 505 might not be appropriate but
the court still determines it is necessary to sanction particular misconduct by
counsel.108 A court might turn to Section 1927 when it does not want to visit
the misconduct sins of an attorney on his or her client—when the client’s only
fault is making a poor choice in counsel.109 For example, in Baiul v. NBC Sports
the court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for sanctions
under Section 1927 against plaintiff’s counsel who had represented a former
Olympic skater in a lengthy series of frivolous actions.110 The defendant
requested sanctions against the attorney, arguing successfully that they were
warranted because he maintained the action for years after it became clear that
the allegations were meritless and contained deficiencies that precluded his
client’s entitlement to relief. The court made detailed findings of fact showing
with clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer’s conduct of the litigation
was in bad faith and made for an improper purpose.111
More types of misconduct can be sanctioned under Section 1927 than under
Rule 11 but there is some overlap. Filing baseless or deceptive pleadings,
baseless opposition papers, or pursuing a position after it is apparent that the
position is devoid of merit and frivolous can fit under Rule 11 and also under

Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin, 791
F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015).
108 See Malibu Media, LLC v. Pelizzo, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,743 (11th Cir. 2015)
(finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial fees under Section 505 because
plaintiff had acted in an objectively reasonable manner up to a point, and affirming order
requiring plaintiff’s counsel to pay vexatious litigation fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 after an
admittedly ‘knee-jerk’ e-mail promising to continue the case against plaintiff).
109 Atkins v. Fischer, 232 F.R.D. 116, 128 (D.D.C. 2005).
110 2016 BL 123918 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (BNA).
111 Id. (explain that the fee award was ultimately reduced, in part due to the plaintiff’s attorney’s
limited financial resources); Baiul v. NBC Sports, 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,931
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith et al., 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
¶ 30,960 (7th Cir. 2016) (imposing substantial sanctions on attorneys operating a “porno-trolling
collective” under Section 1927 and discovery rules for filing frivolous, baseless and bullying
claims, and for obstructing discovery).
106
107
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Section 1927.112 Such misconduct could also lead to an award of attorney’s fees
under 17 U.S.C. § 505,113 but it might not fall within a court’s inherent power to
impose sanctions because this authority can be invoked only for abusive
litigation practices done fraudulently or in bad faith.114 A court can rely on its
inherent equitable powers to award fees to the prevailing party “only where the
unsuccessful litigant has been found to have ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ”115 Thus, a court’s inherent authority to
sanction is narrower than its authority to impose sanctions under Rule 11 or
Section 1927.116
In order for a court to impose sanctions under its inherent equitable powers
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the claim is “ ‘entirely without
color and made for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper
purposes.’ ”117 For instance, in Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer the court relied on its
inherent authority to award $50,000 in attorney’s fees as a sanction after
dismissing defendant Stouffer’s counterclaim. It found that she had produced
at least seven pieces of falsified evidence as well as falsified testimony, and that
she had failed to correct her fraudulent submissions when confronted with
evidence that undermined the validity of those submissions.118 The court made
detailed findings with respect to each incidence of falsified evidence.119 The
degree of misconduct needed to justify imposing sanctions under a court’s
inherent power is underscored by the statement that a party’s fraud on the court
must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the party “sentiently

112 Hart, supra note 5, at 653. See, e.g., Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 111 (D.N.J. 1994)
(imposing sanctions on the plaintiff—former trial counsel—in a motion for sanctions brought
before the court pursuant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent disciplinary
authority); cf. Riley v. Philadelphia, 136 F.R.D. 571, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (attorney’s fees to be paid
by counsel for filing a frivolous action and not dismissing the claim in a timely fashion were
awarded pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
113 Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 236–64 (2d Cir. 2015); Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869,
880–81 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (fees awarded to the defendant under sections 1927 and 505 with the
court leaving it to the Magistrate Judge to allocate the total award between the losing counsel and
his client).
114 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991).
115 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) citing and quoting from
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975).
116 JOSEPH, supra note 101, § 26A1, at 427.
117 Id. citing and quoting from Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088 (2d Cir. 1977); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 336 (2d Cir. 1999).
118 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
119 Id. at 440–44.
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set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the
judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate” the action.120
III. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AWARDS UNDER SECTION 505, RULE 11 AND
SECTION 1927
A. FEES UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 505

There are many post-Fogerty copyright infringement decisions discussing the
award of attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 to prevailing defendants121 and,
as noted earlier,122 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons provides nationwide clarity as to the appropriate test for awarding fees
under Section 505.123 It resolved the “interesting disagreement” and perceived
“venue advantage” for losing plaintiffs in some circuits124 by eliminating the
presumptions for or against fee shifting that had developed in different
circuits.125 However, there was no disagreement prior to the Kirtsaeng ruling that
an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate when the trial court determined that
the plaintiff’s infringement claim was frivolous, objectively unreasonable or
brought in bad faith, both in the legal and factual components of the case.126
Such litigation conduct could also justify an award of fees under Rule 11.127
InDyne, Inc. v. Abacus Technology Corp., involved a claim against Abacus
Technology for allegedly infringing software code used during a contract with

120 Id. at 439 citing and quoting from Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.
1989); Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,986 at 48,951–52
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (referring to assess fees against losing plaintiff’s counsel because he had not
acted in bad faith).
121 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[D][3][b] at 14-230 to 14-243; Robert
Rossi, 1 Attorneys’ Fees § 10.42 (Copyright Actions) (3d ed. 2015).
122 See supra notes 40–54 and accompanying text.
123 Graham, supra note 10, at 4.
124 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,371 (2d Cir. 2015)
(docket number 15-375, cert filed September 24, 2015). The question presented in Kirtsaeng’s
petition was: What is the appropriate standard for awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party
under § 505 of the Copyright Act? Anandaskankar Mazumdar, Textbook Arbitrager Gets Second Trip
to Supreme Court, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Jan. 22, 2016, at 794.
125 Graham, supra note 10, at 1 (“[T]he decision could make copyright fee awards in the Second
Circuit slightly easier to obtain, it may have the opposite impact in circuits such as the Fifth and
Seventh, which employ a presumption in favor of fee shifting that losing parties must
overcome.”).
126 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 7, at 946; LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 469.
127 See supra notes 78–100 and accompanying text.
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NASA.128 The court granted summary judgement for defendant Abacus
because InDyne could not produce a copy of the software that had been
allegedly infringed. Accordingly, it was impossible for InDyne to prove
substantial similarity. This judgement was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.129
The defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees was granted because it was
objectively unreasonable for the plaintiff to sue without evidence of their
software code in order to prove substantial similarity, the court found that
plaintiff’s motives were questionable, and said that other copyright holders
without evidence of software code should be deterred from filing similar
suits.130 In short, the plaintiff’s claim was objectively unreasonable, its motive
was dubious, and the court recognized a need to deter similar claims.131 Under
these circumstances, it might have been possible to justify fee shifting under
Rule 11.132
The developers of the very popular World of Warcraft computer game were
awarded attorney’s fees under section 505 after a former employee’s copyright
infringement suit was dismissed on summary judgment.133 The plaintiff had
been a game master for the defendant who also performed voiceover work at
the game developer’s invitation. She believed her voice was being used solely
for promotional videos but after leaving the company she learned that her
voiceovers were also used in the games. The court concluded that she had no
copyright interest in the voiceovers because content creation was one of her
duties as spelled out in the employment manual so this made the voiceovers
128 No. 6:11VC137Orl-22DAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23582 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2014), aff’d,
No. 14-11058, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18266 (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2014) (trial court did not abuse
discretion when it ruled that plaintiff’s decision to sue without proof of an element of its prima
facie case was objectively unreasonable).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 555. See also Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, 2015 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,797
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (entitling Rapper Jay Z to $250,000 in fees against a plaintiff whose claims were
clearly time-barred and thus objectively unreasonable); Medallion Home Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Tivoli
Homes of Sarasota, Inc., 2016 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,999 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (award of fees
justified because plaintiff’s architectural copyright infringement claims were objectively
unreasonable).
131 See also Choyce v. SF Bay Area Indep. Media Ctr., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155438 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (fees awarded to prevailing defendant after plaintiff’s claim was dismissed with prejudice
under Rule 12(b)(6) as being objectively baseless, failing to take steps to ensure he had a valid
claim, and then making additional meritless arguments); Murphy v. Lazarev, 2016 Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,951 (6th Cir. 2010) (entitling defendant pop singer to fees and costs because
infringement claims were frivolous and unreasonable).
132 Cf. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
See also supra notes 90–100 and accompanying text.
133 Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. C12-1096-CW 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135889, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014).
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work-for-hire.134 In ruling on the defendant developer’s fee request the court
concluded that the employee’s suit was “objectively unreasonable and bordered
on frivolous” and her motivation was questionable.135 It said that “deterring
such meritless claims supports the objective of the Copyright Act.”136 Here
again, there was a frivolous claim, a bad motive and the need to deter similar
meritless claims.137 It may have been appropriate to support the award of fees
under Rule 11.138
In 2011 Perfect 10, the operator of an adult website, sued Giganews, Inc. for
infringement alleging that Giganews users had posted Perfect 10’s images in
messages on the Giganews usenet service.139 Perfect 10 ultimately lost and the
court ordered it to pay Giganews more than $5.2 million in attorney’s fees
under Section 505 even though the company’s suit was deemed not frivolous
when filed because it “involve[ed] difficult and somewhat novel questions of
law.”140 However, this determination did not prevent the court from saying an
award of attorney’s fees was appropriate to promote the purposes of the

Id. at *6.
She made a $1.2 million settlement demand and did not respond to the developer’s
settlement offer of $15,000. The court granted $152,104 in fees but reduced the award to $15,000
due to the employee’s financial situation. Id. See also City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. 2:15-cv01815 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (holding city’s infringement claim against defendant’s posting of videos of
council meetings on YouTube was objectively unreasonable, the city was suing to stifle his
criticism of council, and awarding fees furthered the purposes of the act).
136 Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. C12-1096-CW, 2014 U.S. Distilled, LEXIS 135889, at
*8. Blizzard was awarded $13,757 for prevailing on plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, and
$15,000 for prevailing on the copyright claim. Id. at *15. See also Savant Homes, Inc. v. Douglas
Consulting LLC, 2015 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,811 (D. Colo. 2015) (stating that although
plaintiff’s infringement theory might not have been frivolous or objectively unreasonable, the case
warranted an award of fees for equitable reasons in that the plaintiff promoted no public good by
suing over allegedly infringing custom homes and imposed substantial expenses on the
defendants which were far in excess of damages it could have recovered).
137 See also Conrad v. AM Cmty. Credit Union, 750 F.3d 634, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming
dismissal of plaintiff’s suit as being without merit, noting her abuse of process by filing multiple
frivolous suits and being ordered to pay attorney’s fees, and suggesting that she should be
enjoined from suing again until she pays her debts); cf. Elfie Film, LLC. v. Gregory Murphy, 2015
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,834 (2d Cir. 2015) (awarding fees in unsuccessful defense in a
declaratory judgment action).
138 Cf. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). See also supra notes 79–
89 and accompanying text.
139 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV-11-07098-AB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54063, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015).
140 Id. The court noted that Perfect 10’s suit was like its 2005 claims against Google and
Amazon.com which it lost after the Ninth Circuit held that thumbnail images of Perfect 10
photos were transformative and thus protected as a fair use.
134
135
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Copyright Act141 because “there [was] ample evidence . . . that Perfect 10
pursued this litigation for reasons inconsistent with the purpose of the
Copyright Act, and this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney’s fees.”142
It likened Perfect 10 to a copyright troll that was in the business of litigation,
not protecting its copyrights.143
The Kirtsaeng decision should not alter the outcome of this ruling and similar
cases because the Supreme Court made clear that a “court could award fees
even though the losing party presented reasonable arguments, or it could deny
fees even though the losing party made unreasonable arguments.”144 Either
way, perhaps the conduct of Perfect 10’s attorneys in litigation against Giga
News also violated their obligations under Rule 11(b)(1); by signing they
certified to the court “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information,
and belief” that pleadings, motions or other papers are “not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.”145
A frivolous claim inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act and
the need for deterrence came together to justify an award of attorney’s fees
against the Estate of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle for its unsuccessful effort to

Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *31.
143 Id. See also Omega SA v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2015) (awarding
fees against Omega’s unsuccessful effort to control sale of its watches via copyright upheld
because it would further the purposes of the Copyright Act); Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, 2015
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,777 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that lower court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to defendants who prevailed on an implied license theory
even though it did not explicitly state that the award promoted the purposes of the Copyright
Act), certiorari denied, No. 15-431 (Dec. 7, 2015), reported in PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) – DAILY EDITION (12/7/15); Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design
Inc., 2015 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30,848 (E.D. Va. 2015) (providing same outcome in an
architectural copyright infringement action between competitors even though the plaintiff’s
positions were not objectively unreasonable but based on plausible theories—the prevailing
defendant was entitled to an award of fees because there was evidence that the plaintiff filed the
suit to force a settlement rather than to protect its copyright, and to pursue an unusually large
damages claim); Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 437 (7th
Cir. 2004) (Seventh Circuit awarded attorney’s fees against a plaintiff whose suit was marginal, but
not frivolous because the plaintiff’s claim attempted to improperly annex a portion of the public
domain and the court said an award of fees was appropriate because the plaintiff was using its
infringement suit “to obtain property protection, here in data, that copyright clearly does not
confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that
may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively”).
144 High Court Vacates, Remands Denial of Fees to Textbook Seller, 459 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) at 1
(June 21, 2016).
145 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
141
142
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extend the life of Sherlock Holmes’ copyright to 135 years. Starting in 1887,
Doyle published fifty-six stories and four novels with the great detective
Sherlock Holmes as the central character. His final ten Holmes stories,
published between 1923 and 1927, are still protected by copyright and will be
joining all his pre-1923 works in the public domain between 2018 and 2022.146
After being told by the Doyle estate to pay a $5,000 license fee in order to put
together an anthology of stories by current authors using Holmes, Dr. Watson
and other characters from Doyle’s public domain works, Leslie Klinger sought a
declaratory judgment that he was free to use all the materials from those public
domain works.147 The trial court eventually issued the declaratory judgment for
Klinger and the estate appealed.148 Judge Posner, writing for the Court of
Appeals,149 responded to the estate’s contention that copyright on a complex
character like Sherlock Holmes does not enter the public domain until the
copyright on the final story expires150 by saying that there was no basis “in
statute or case law for extending a copyright beyond its expiration. When a
story falls into the public domain, story elements—including characters covered
by the expired copyright—become fair game for follow on authors, . . . .”151 He
stated that the estate “suggested no legal grounds for extending copyright

Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 755 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 497–98; id. at 500 (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989)); id. at 503.
Klinger and his co-editor entered into negotiations with a publisher when the estate insisted on
the license. There also was a threat by the estate to sue for infringement. Klinger’s action
acknowledged that he could not use those aspects of the post-1923 works which were still
protected by copyright. There was no serious contention that Holmes, Watson and other well
developed characters in this series of works were not entitled to copyright protection to begin
with. Rather the issue was what happens to the many of those characters’ traits as the works start
entering the public domain with the expiration of their copyrights. The court noted that a
decision in the Second Circuit involving the fictional Amos and Andy characters was very similar
to this case.
148 Id. at 498. The Doyle estate defaulted and the court gave Klinger leave to file a motion for
summary judgment. The estate responded to this motion with some novel arguments about
enlarging copyright protection.
149 Judge Posner first had to deal with the estate’s argument that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction. It contended unsuccessfully that there was no case or controversy between the
parties, and that Klinger’s suit was not ripe. Id. at 498–500.
150 Id. at 498, 500. The estate also contended that even though many Holmes stories were in
the public domain it was still wrong to permit the use of these not yet fully developed characters
even though the stories could be used. Id. at 498.
151 Id. at 500 (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1989) as a case similar
to Klinger’s action against the Doyle estate).
146
147
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protection beyond the limits fixed by Congress” and that the “appeal borders
on the quixotic.”152
This victory was followed by Klinger’s request that the Conan Doyle estate
reimburse the attorney’s fees he incurred on the appeal153 pursuant to Section
505 of the Copyright Act.154 Judge Posner noted that the Seventh Circuit had
stated previously that as “a consequence of a successful defense of an
infringement suit the defendant is entitled to a ‘very strong’ presumption in
favor of receiving attorney’s fees in order to ensure that an infringement
defendant does not abandon a meritorious defense in situations in which ‘the
cost of vindication exceeds the private benefit to the party.”155 He explained
that in this case it did not matter that the alleged infringer was the plaintiff
because “a declaratory-judgment plaintiff in a copyright case is in effect a
defendant permitted to precipitate the infringement suit.”156 Judge Posner then
turned to the estate’s business plan of charging a modest license fee for which
there was no legal basis, and said that this worked until Klinger resisted,
becoming a private attorney general to combat “a disreputable business
practice—a form of extortion—and he is seeking by the present motion not to
obtain a reward but merely to avoid a loss.”157 Here again, there is a reasonable

152 Id. at 503. The court added that perpetual copyright would violate the copyright clause of
the constitution. The Supreme Court later denied the estate’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,619 (Nov. 13, 2014).
153 It is the trial courts which ordinarily award attorney’s fees in copyright infringement cases,
but it is settled that fees can also be awarded for services rendered on an appeal. NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.10[E] at 14-243.
154 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, 761 F.3d 789, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 505). Those fees totaled $30,679.93 and Klinger filed a separate petition with the district court
for his fees and related costs there tallying $39,123.44.
155 Id. at 791 (quoting Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC. v. WIREdata, Inc., 361
F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Seventh Circuit, per Posner, stated in WIREdata that:
[w]hen the prevailing party is the defendant, who by definition receives not a
small award but no award, the presumption in favor of awarding fees is very
strong. . . . For without the prospect of such an award, the party might be
forced into a nuisance settlement or deterred altogether from exercising his
rights.
361 F.3d at 437. The Seventh Circuit’s presumption is now likely inappropriate following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
156 761 F.3d at 792.
157 Id. He concluded by saying it was time for the estate to change its business model and
ordered it to pay Klinger’s fees. The court also discussed the serious problems the estate faced in
asking booksellers to cooperate with it in enforcing its nonexistent copyright claims against
Klinger—joining in the boycott of one of the estate’s competitors. This raised serious antitrust
issues. The estate petitioned for an emergency stay of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling which was
denied by Justice Kagan. Allisa Wickham, LAW360, July 19, 2014.
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argument that the attorney for the Conan Doyle estate violated Rule 11(b)(2) by
asserting expired copyrights in the many Sherlock Holmes stories and
characters which had entered the public domain.158
Notwithstanding Judge Posner’s statement in the Conan Doyle estate
litigation about victorious defendants being entitled to a strong presumption in
favor of receiving fees,159 awards of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in
copyright infringement actions were never supposed to be automatic.160
Section 505 is a may-also-award provision. The Supreme Court made this point
in Fogerty by rejecting the defendant’s argument for adoption of the British
rule,161 and it was re-emphasized in the Court’s recent decision in Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons.162 There the Court underscored the district court’s discretion
in making fee awards, and made clear that although substantial weight should be
given to the question of whether the losing side had a reasonable case to fight,
all the other factors listed in Fogerty should be taken into account beyond the
reasonableness of litigating positions.163 It is no longer appropriate to make
presumptions about fee awards under Section 505.164 However, this does not
mean that the Klinger fee ruling would come out differently post-Kirtsaeng
without the Seventh Circuit’s presumption because the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Doyle estate’s infringement claim was unreasonable and
158 Under FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), an attorney who files a pleading or other written document
certifies that the “claims . . . and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law.”
159 761 F.3d at 791. Cf. Marshall & Swift/Boeckh, LLC. v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC, 586 Fed.
App’x 448 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating the trial court did not err when it declined to apply the
presumption that prevailing defendant is entitled to fees).
160 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (vacating award of fees to
successful defendants in part because there was no reason for the plaintiff to have known at the
outset that his chances of success were slim to none); ZilYen, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 215 (D.D.C. 2013) (award of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant who won on a
motion to dismiss was not warranted); Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. Von Muller, 540 Fed. App’x
103 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding award of attorney’s fees for redetermination); Reinicke v. Creative
Empire, LLC., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding no fee award warranted because
plaintiff’s claim was neither objectively unreasonable nor brought in bad faith); Zalewski v. T.P.
Builders, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (awarding no fees because the
problems with plaintiff’s pleadings were attributable more to counsel’s lack of talent than to any
bad faith by the plaintiff); cf. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., AIPLA NEWSSTAND, Apr. 12,
2016 (district court denied request of Marvin Gaye’s family for $3.5 million in attorney’s fees
following victory in the highly publicized “Blurred Lines” trial).
161 510 U.S. at 533–34. See also supra notes 27–43 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
163 136 S. Ct. at 1982–83; Mazumdar, supra note 9.
164 Graham, supra note 10, at 1, 4.
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frivolous.165 In contrast, the infringement claim by publisher John Wiley &
Sons against the importer of the low-priced text books was neither frivolous,
marginal, nor inconsistent with the purposes of copyright.166 The Doyle estate’s
frivolous and unreasonable claim might trigger fee shifting under Rule 11 as
well as under Section 505, but the John Wiley & Son’s claim against Kirtsaeng
would not.
B. FEES UNDER RULE 11

The losing parties and their attorneys in the copyright infringement actions
summarized above, in which fees were awarded under Section 505, might have
violated their obligations under Rule 11 as well. When they presented their
pleadings, motions, and other papers, each of these attorneys certified to the
court “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances”167 that the
document was not being presented for an improper purpose, that it had
evidentiary support, and that it was warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous
argument for changing existing law.168 When a court granting a motion for fees
under Section 505 concludes that a copyright infringement claim was
objectively unreasonable and frivolous, and also questions the losing party’s
motive, it often could also conclude that Rule 11 was violated.169 After all,
“where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under
the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to
extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands,” Rule 11 is violated.170
This is not to suggest that Rule 11 violations can be found every time a
court awards fees under Section 505 to a prevailing alleged infringer. In
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 761 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 2014).
Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1984; see also Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV15-3402 RGK
(AGRx) (C.D. Cal. 2016) (district court judge declines to award $800,000 in fees to prevailing
defendants in highly publicized Stairway to Heaven litigation because the plaintiff’s claim was
objectively reasonable and properly motivated); Loeb & Loeb LLP, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Aug. 8,
2016); Dorsey & Whitney LLP, All That Glitters is Not Gold for Led Zeppelin’s Claim for Attorney’s
Fees, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Aug. 25, 2016); Bronstad, supra note 16.
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
168 FREER, supra note 59, at 381 (discussing the obligations of FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). These
obligations apply with equal force to those defending claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4)).
169 See the discussions of several cases at supra notes 128–66 in which the courts concluded that the
claims were objectively unreasonable and frivolous and questioned the losing parties’ motives.
170 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating “it
was error for the district court to deny municipal defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees incurred
in defending” a claim that was destined to fail and on remand the court was impose appropriate
sanctions against the appellant, their counsel, or both).
165
166
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jurisdictions where courts had said, pre-Kirtsaeng, that “a consequence of the
successful defense of an infringement suit the defendant is entitled to a ‘very
strong’ presumption in favor of receiving attorney’s fees, in order to ensure that
an infringement defendant does not abandon a meritorious defense,”171 it
would not be appropriate to conclude that the plaintiff violated Rule 11 by
filing suit because simply losing does not mean the plaintiff’s suit was frivolous,
meritless or without foundation. In essence, this now discredited strong
presumption of fee shifting meant that attorney’s fees might be awarded against
a plaintiff whose claim was neither frivolous nor objectively unreasonable. The
same would have held true in those circuits in which it has been held that the
award of fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act was routine—the rule
rather than the exception.172 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Kirtsaeng seems to put an end to presumptions when courts exercise
their discretion to award fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act.173
On the other hand, many of the courts which awarded attorney’s fees as a
sanction for a Rule 11 violation in a copyright infringement case could have
justified the fee shifting under Section 505 because the underlying claim was
objectively unreasonable or frivolous. Nevertheless, the courts relied on Rule
11 instead of Section 505 so they could order the fees to be paid by the losing
attorney rather than the losing party. Section 505 has not been interpreted to
permit the prevailing party’s fees to be paid by opposing counsel.174 For
example, in Hays v. Sony Corporation of America sanctions were sought against
opposing counsel under Rule 11 even though the defendant seemed to have a
viable claim for fees under Section 505.175 The trial court, after dismissing the
plaintiffs’ copyright infringement suit for failure to state a claim, awarded
171 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 761 F.3d at 791 (quoting Assessment Techs. of Wis.,
LLC. v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Seventh Circuit, per Posner,
stated in WIREdata that
[w]hen the prevailing party is the defendant, who by definition receives not a
small award but no award, the presumption in favor of awarding fees is very
strong. . . . . For without the prospect of such an award, the party might be
forced into a nuisance settlement or deterred altogether from exercising his
rights.
Assessment Tech., 361 F.3d at 437 (stating “the cost of vindication might otherwise exceed the
private benefit to the party”).
172 Thoroughbred Software Int’l v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 362 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 380 (5th Cir. 2004)).
173 See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir 2015) (the Copyright Act
allows for the imposition of costs and fees only against a party, and not the party’s attorney (citing
17 U.S.C. § 505)).
175 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
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defendant Sony $14,895.46 in attorney’s fees under Rule 11 against the
plaintiffs’ lawyer but not against the plaintiffs, who were two high school
teachers.176 The lawyer appealed the sanctions, and the Seventh Circuit stated
that the merit of his appeal “depends on the reasonableness of his pressing the
suit as far as he did.”177 Although it concluded that the suit was a “mixture of
the frivolous and the non-frivolous,”178 it affirmed because it was clear that the
trial judge awarded sanctions because the suit had not been pursued effectively
by the attorney.179 The court stated:
In the Rule 11 setting, the victims are the lawyer’s adversary,
other litigants in the court’s queue, and the court itself. By
asserting claims without first inquiring whether they have a
plausible grounding in law and fact, a lawyer can impose on an
adversary and on the judicial system substantial costs that would
have been—and should have been—avoided by a reasonable
prepleading inquiry.180
The court also noted that plaintiffs’ counsel, a solo practitioner from a small
town, was not to be criticized for lacking expertise in copyright law and the
niceties of federal procedure:
[b]ut the Rule 11 standard, like the negligence standard in tort
law, is an objective standard . . . [which] . . . makes no allowance
for
the
particular
circumstances
of
particular
practitioners. . . . There is no ‘locality rule’ in legal
malpractice . . . the generalist acts at his peril if he brings a suit in
a field or forum with which he is unacquainted.181

Id. at 413.
Id. at 414.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 417. This is why the trial court awarded Sony different percentages of the fees it had
incurred in defending the suit from the time it was filed to the point the plaintiff’s lawyer should
have realized that the suit was hopeless, and from two other periods during the litigation. Id. at
417–18. The Seventh Circuit said “this method of calculation was lenient.” Id. at 418.
180 Id. at 418.
181 Id. at 418–19 (citations omitted). The court added that in these circumstances counsel
should seek assistance from a lawyer with the required expertise, or learn the relevant law at every
step of the case and litigate very carefully. Id. at 419. The plaintiffs’ lawyer had “failed to heed
this precept.” Id. The Court of Appeals also granted Sony’s request that plaintiffs’ counsel pay
the attorney’s fees it incurred defending that portion of his appeal that sought to overturn the
176
177
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Perhaps the defendant in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America did not seek an award
of attorney’s fees under Section 505 because the plaintiffs’ statutory copyright
infringement claim was not totally without merit even though most of their
requests for relief were frivolous.182 Nevertheless, the district court dismissed
the action, so defendant Sony was the prevailing party.183 The more practical
reasons for seeking sanctions against the plaintiffs’ attorney under Rule 11
instead of from the plaintiffs under the Copyright Act might have been that the
two school teachers would not have had the financial capacity to pay Sony’s
attorneys and, as noted above, because Section 505 has not been interpreted to
permit the prevailing party’s fees to be paid by opposing counsel.184
The trial court in Christian v. Mattel, Inc. invoked Rule 11 to award attorney’s
fees as a sanction in a copyright infringement suit.185 This decision also might
have come out the same way under Section 505 of the Copyright Act but for
the fact the fees were to be paid by the plaintiff’s attorney, not the plaintiff.186
The plaintiff’s claim was that Mattel’s “Cool Blue” Barbie allegedly infringed the
copyright on her blonde doll with blue eyes called “Claudene” that resembled a
University of Southern California cheerleader.187 The plaintiff created this doll
in 1996 and received copyright registration in 1997.188 She sought damages of
$2.4 billion and injunctive relief against Mattel.189 The major problem with her
claim was that Mattel had clear and convincing evidence that its Cool Blue
Barbie could not, as a matter of law, have infringed the copyright on plaintiff’s
doll because Cool Blue had been created and copyrighted in 1991, several years
before the plaintiff’s doll was created.190 Mattel filed a motion for summary
judgment and tried to convince plaintiff’s lawyer that the complaint was
frivolous, but he refused to even look at the Cool Blue Barbie doll at a meeting

judgment on the merits. Id. at 419–20. The basis for this order was not Rule 11 because an
appellate court cannot award fees under this Rule. Id. at 420.
182 Id. at 415, 417.
183 Id. at 420.
184 Sony initially sought some $47,000 in fees and related costs against the attorney, and the
court awarded $14,895.46. Id. at 413. See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264
(2d Cir. 2015) (stating that the Copyright Act allows for the imposition of costs and fees only
against a party, and not the party’s attorney (citing 17 U.S.C. § 505)).
185 286 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
186 The district court had awarded attorney’s fees to Mattel in a related action, and Mattel had
also sued Christian’s company, Collegiate Doll Company, in which that company’s multiple
counterclaims against Mattel had been dismissed. That case settled. Id. at 1122, 1125.
187 Id. at 1122–23.
188 Id. at 1123 & n.2.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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with Mattel’s lawyer and threw the dolls off a conference table.191 The
plaintiff’s attorney should have recognized that this copyright infringement
claim against Mattel had no basis whatsoever.192
Having been unsuccessful in convincing Hicks to dismiss
Christian’s action voluntarily, Mattel served Hicks with a motion
for Rule 11 sanctions . . . argu[ing], among other things, that
Hicks had signed and filed a frivolous complaint based on the
legally meritless theory that Mattel’s prior-created head sculptures
infringed Claudene’s 1997 copyright. Hicks declined to withdraw
the complaint during the 21-day safe harbor period provided by
Rule 11, and Mattel filed its motion [for sanctions].193
Notwithstanding this motion Hicks fought back and filed additional papers
but the trial court granted Mattel’s motion for summary judgment.194 In
subsequently granting Mattel’s Rule 11 motion for sanctions, the trial court said
that the plaintiff’s attorney had “filed a meritless claim against defendant Mattel.
A reasonable investigation by Mr. Hicks would have revealed that there was no
factual foundation for [Christian’s] copyright claim.”195 The court awarded
Mattel $501,565 in attorney’s fees to be paid by Hicks.196
Even though the Ninth Circuit later agreed with Hicks that the trial court
had improperly considered conduct other than that covered by Rule 11 in
making the fee shifting award, such as discovery abuses and misstatements to
the court during oral presentations,197 there was no doubt that the filing of this
frivolous infringement claim warranted sanctions under Rule 11.198 Given the
fact that the claim was frivolous and without merit, an award of attorney’s fees
to Mattel under Section 505 of the Copyright Act would have been warranted,
Id.
Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1124 (explaining that since Mattel had created the alleged infringing doll long before
plaintiff created Claudene, Mattel could not have copied the plaintiff’s doll).
195 Id. The plaintiff’s attorney had engaged in other forms of misconduct spelled out by the trial
court; the court therefore asked Mattel to provide a general description of the work its attorneys
performed to defend the frivolous claim.
196 Id. at 1125–26.
197 Id. at 1125, 1130–31.
198 Id. at 1129, 1131–32 (holding that the trial court’s order be vacated, and on remand that the
trial court was to determine whether or not the time spent by Mattel’s attorneys was reasonably
and appropriately spent in relation to both the patent frivolousness of the complaint and the
services directly caused by the sanctionable conduct).
191
192
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but it appears that Mattel wanted to send a message to the plaintiff’s attorney,
Mr. James B. Hicks.199
There are other decisions in which courts have turned to Rule 11 to award
attorney’s fees, payable by plaintiff’s counsel, for filing frivolous copyright
infringement claims which were ultimately dismissed even though an award of
attorney’s fees payable by the plaintiff under Section 505 might have been
justified. In Smith & Johnson, Inc. v. Hedaya Home Fashions, Inc.200 the court
ordered plaintiff’s attorney to pay the defendant $500 as a Rule 11 sanction for
filing an infringement claim that was clearly frivolous because the plaintiff had
stipulated in a related action that it did not own copyrights in certain designs for
afghan shawls and blankets at issue in this and a prior case filed originally in
federal court.201 “Plaintiff cannot state a claim with no probability of success
merely to get back into federal court—a court it was once so anxious to escape.
In such circumstances, sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate to deter
baseless claims.”202 Similarly, in Historical Truth Productions, Inc. v. Sony Pictures
Entertainment203 the court turned to Rule 11 to sanction the plaintiff’s lawyer
after granting summary judgment for defendants because no reasonable juror
could find substantial similarity between plaintiff’s proposed movie, The Last
Boxer, and defendants’ film Universal Soldier.204 The defendants’ motion for
sanctions alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff had misrepresented the
content of the works at issue, and the court agreed that the allegations of
similarity contained outright falsehoods. The judge stated that he was
troubled at this apparent attempt to deceive the court, and I can
only conclude that plaintiff’s attorney either did not closely
examine . . . allegations or did not carefully review the two works
upon which the allegations are based. Defendants have been put

199 Id. at 1130–31. The Court of Appeals also acknowledged alternative bases for fee shifting–
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and inherent authority–and said that, on remand, the trial court, would have an
opportunity to spell out the bases for its sanctions order.
200 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19023 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
201 Id. at *3–4, *24.
202 Id. at *24–25. The defendant’s motion for fees under Section 1927 was denied because even
though the claim was frivolous, it did not multiply the proceedings. Id. at *25.
203 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17477 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
204 See generally id. (showing the court’s very thorough and in depth comparison of the two
works).
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to needless expense contesting a claim the/that plaintiff’s
attorney should have recognized as meritless.205
Here again, an award of attorney’s fees under section 505 might have been
warranted, and it was the opposing counsel who was obligated to pay
defendant’s attorney’s fees under Rule 11.
Similarly, in Robinson v. Double R Records the court also concluded that
plaintiff’s counsel had violated Rule 11(b)(2) by bringing an infringement claim
against his client’s co-author because it is settled law that a joint copyright
owner cannot sue his co-owner for infringement.206 In addition, a claim for
royalties under a compulsory license had no chance of success because the
“ ‘Plaintiffs allege[d] that at no time have Defendants obtained a compulsory
license pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 115,’ ” thus foreclosing any claim.207 The court
ordered plaintiff’s counsel to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees incurred in
defending these frivolous claims.208 In this regard, Rule 11(c)(5)(A) makes clear
that courts cannot impose a monetary sanction against a represented party for
205 Id. at *41. The court asked the defendants’ attorney to document fees and expenses, and
gave the plaintiff’s attorney an opportunity to respond before making a final determination of the
sanction at a later conference.
206 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS S1459, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
207 Id. (citing Court Order at 14, Robinson v. Double R Records, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS S1459
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 04-4120), 2007 WL 2049724).
208 Robinson v. Double R. Records, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS S1459, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(quoting the court’s earlier order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against the plaintiff). The court
told the defendant to submit a computation of the attorney’s fees and expenses it incurred in
defending against the frivolous claims. See also Tilmon-Jones v. Boladian, 581 Fed. Appx. 493
(6th Cir. 2014). The Sixth Circuit discussed the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for a Rule
11 violation, to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel, in connection with related disputes over royalties.
In one dispute the widow attacked a consent order she had entered with Bridgeport Music and
Bridgeport’s President whereby all causes of action and claims against Bridgeport, including
future claims, were dismissed with prejudice. She moved to set it aside, alleging fraud by
defendant’s counsel for withholding documents. The defendants showed that the documents in
question had been produced, so the widow withdrew her motion but soon refiled, alleging fraud
and misconduct. Id. at 495–96. The trial court explained that its award of $20,000 in fees was
because counsel had “vexatiously and unreasonably multiplied the proceeding . . . for the
improper purpose of harassing the defendants.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed this award after
noting that it seemed low. Id. at 497. The second dispute arose subsequent to, and in part from,
the same consent order and settlement that had disposed of all known and unknown claims
against Bridgeport. Accordingly, Bridgeport moved to dismiss and for sanctions, and the trial
court ruled in its favor on both motions. The consent order barred the plaintiffs’ claims, so the
suit was a meritless action lacking factual and legal support. The Sixth Circuit agreed with making
a fee award as a sanction but remanded for a better explanation, raising concerns that the amount
might not have been sufficient for deterrence given counsel’s egregious conduct in filing the suit.
Id. at 496–99. This might have been an appropriate case for fee shifting under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
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his or her attorney’s violation of the Rule 11(b)(2) obligation to certify that a
claim is warranted by existing law.209
Several courts have said that the kind of misconduct that justifies the award
of fees under Section 1927 could also justify fee shifting under Rule 11 or
Section 505 of the Copyright Act. For example, in Burger-Moss v. Steinman the
plaintiff consented to summary judgement for the defendants on the ground
that it could not prove that defendants had access to its copyrighted work.210
The defendants sought sanctions because the plaintiff should have withdrawn
the suit early in the litigation after all the facts were uncovered and it became
clear that access could not be established.211 The court granted the motion
against plaintiff’s counsel who put the defendants to three years of effort and
expense defending the baseless claims and had thus vexatiously multiplied the
proceeding to warrant fee shifting under Section 1927. In addition, there had
been a clear violation of Rule 11(b)(2).212
IV. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR FEES
The decisions discussed in this Article show that although neither the
Copyright Act nor Rule 11 mandate the award of attorney’s fees, and although
both grant considerable discretion to the trial judge awarding attorney’s fees,
there are differences. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in
Lieb v. Topstone Industries:
Rule 11 may be applied to only a small segment of the litigation,
but the Copyright Act looks to the whole of the case.
Furthermore, Rule 11 is more insistent on imposing sanctions
where objectively a case lacks merit than is the Copyright Act.
However, the rule offers a broader selection of remedies.
Although it is possible that the Copyright Act and Rule 11 may in
some circumstances apply to identical conduct, it should be

209 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A) (showing sanctions can be imposed against a pro se litigant). The
obligations under FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) explicitly apply to unrepresented parties. See, e.g., Smith v.
Education People, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a Rule 11 sanction, in the
form of an injunction against duplicative litigation, was warranted based on the pro se plaintiff filing
collaterally estopped copyright infringement actions against defendant’s vendors and customers).
210 Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 453.
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understood that there should be no duplication of any recovery
for counsel fees.213
The ‘overlap’ cases, in which a prevailing defendant has sought attorney’s
fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act, and as a sanction under Rule 11,
present a fairly standard scenario: (a) the plaintiff files an infringement claim
that is objectively unreasonable and frivolous; (b) the defendant files a motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment and also serves plaintiff with a motion for
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) that spells out the serious defects with the
complaint; (c) the plaintiff fails to withdraw or correct the complaint within the
twenty-one day safe harbor provided by Rule 11; (d) the motion for sanctions is
then filed with the court; (e) the court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment; (f) the defendant seeks attorney’s fees under Section
505; and (g) the court has to rule on this request and on the defendant’s motion
for sanctions under Rule 11.214 In some of these situations, the courts also
discuss 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and their inherent equitable authority to impose
sanctions. Here are the key principles which can be drawn from these ‘overlap’
decisions.
No Duplicative Awards: These bases for awarding attorney’s fees are
alternative grounds and there will be only one award. For instance, in United
States ex rel. Taylor v. Times Herald Record Newspaper an inmate at a correctional
facility claimed that a series of newspaper articles about the Shawangunk region
in New York infringed the copyright on his unpublished science fiction novel
titled Shawangunk.215 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants against this pro se litigant, finding that his allegations were totally
without merit.216 The defendants’ application for costs and attorney’s fees
under Section 505 was granted with the court acknowledging that despite this
pro se plaintiff’s lack of legal training, his claim of infringement was objectively
213 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986). Lieb was discussed and cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in its Fogerty decision. 510 U.S. at 534 n.19 (1994).
214 Cf. Gal v. Viacom International, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The court
ultimately denied the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion making any award of attorney’s fees under
section 505 inappropriate. The court was, however, troubled by plaintiff’s counsel failing to
discover and correct an error in the initial filing, even after defendant’s counsel had pointed out
the mistake in a letter. Nevertheless, it did not award sanctions because defendant’s counsel’s
letter did not comply with Rule 11 in that it was not in the form of a motion. Id. at 307–09.
215 1992 WL 236163 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
216 Id. at *1 (stating “[n]ot one of the eighty-four purported instances of copying in the
Shawangunk articles is ‘similar,’ as that word is used in common parlance, much less ‘substantially
similar,’ as that term is used in copyright jurisprudence, to plaintiff’s unpublished novel,
Shawangunk”).
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frivolous and without any apparent justification, and that it “would be unfair to
require the defendants to bear the cost of attorney’s fees.”217 It concluded in
response to the defendants’ motion for sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 that
given the differences between the newspaper articles and his novel, the plaintiff
“should have known that his infringement claim was entirely fanciful” and said
that the defendants were entitled to sanctions under Rule 11.218 Still, the court
decided against assessing sanctions because attorney’s fees were being awarded
to the prevailing defendant under Section 505.219 The court added that if the
fee award under Section 505 was vacated, then the FED. R. CIV. P. 11 sanctions
would be assessed.220 In any event, an award under Rule 11 would have been
duplicative of the Section 505 award, and there should be no duplication of any
recovery of counsel fees.221
This point was also made in Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading,222 which
was a complicated suit involving characters from the movie Gremlins. The court
ultimately found that an infringement claim by Warner Brothers was
unreasonable, that it had continued to litigate after it became unreasonable, and
that even though it had not acted in bad faith, its conduct was vexatious,
oppressive and unreasonable.223 The Court decided to award attorney’s fees to
the prevailing party224 and then added that the defendants had also asked for an
award of attorney’s fees under Rule 11, but “[s]ince attorney’s fees are being
awarded to defendants under 17 U.S.C. § 505, we need not stop to determine
that, as seems likely, they also be awarded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.”225 Here
also, an award of fees under Rule 11 would have duplicated the fees awarded
under Section 505.226
Who pays the fees; the attorney or the client: Another principle that
emerges from these overlap cases is that liability for the payment of attorney’s
fees under Section 505 can be imposed only against the losing party, not his or

Id. at *2.
Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986).
222 677 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
223 Id. at 773.
224 Id. at 772–73.
225 Id. at 774.
226 See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 864–65 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (the award of fees under Rule 11 was not supplementary to the award of fees under the
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act but an additional foundation for reaching the same result).
217
218
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her attorney.227 On the other hand, fee awards under Section 1927 are generally
paid by counsel,228 violations of the obligations imposed by Rule 11(b)(2) must
be paid by counsel, and joint and several liability is possible for violations of
the obligations in Rule 11(b)(3).
For example, in Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute the trial court
awarded attorney’s fees under Section 505 and imposed sanctions under Rule
11, with the losing plaintiff paying fees under 505 and his lawyer paying fees
under Rule 11.229 The plaintiff, Dr. Zuk, was a psychologist who worked on the
faculty of the Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute (EPPI) in the early
1970s.230 He had a technician film some of his family therapy sessions, and the
films were then made available for rental.231 He also wrote a book containing
transcripts of some of these sessions which was copyrighted in 1975.232 Long
after Zuk left EPPI he filed suit alleging that EPPI was infringing his copyright
on the book by continuing to rent the films.233 EPPI moved to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the copyright on the book did not extend to
the films, and because these claims were barred by the statute of limitations.234
EPPI also notified Zuk’s attorney of its intention to move for sanctions under
Rule 11 on the ground that he had failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into
the facts and the law.235 The motion to dismiss was granted.236 EPPI next
moved for attorney’s fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act and shortly
thereafter moved for sanctions under Rule 11.237 The trial court ultimately held
that the plaintiff and his lawyer were jointly and severally liable to EPPI for

227 Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (Section 505 does
not expressly authorize an award from an attorney for a party); 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791
F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015) (the Copyright Act allows for the imposition of costs and fees only
against a party, not the party’s attorney); cf. Neff v. Vidmark, Inc., 923 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir.
1991) (when a statute authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties does not
mention an award against counsel the appropriate inference in that an award against attorneys is
not authorized).
228 Section 1927 allows a court to require an attorney to satisfy personally cost and fees. 16
Casa Duse, LLC. v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2015); Royal Oak Entm’t v. City of Royal
Oak, 486 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (a court may hold parties and counsel jointly
and severally liable under Section 1927).
229 103 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1996).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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attorney’s fees of $15,000.00, concluding that joint and several liability was
permissible under Rule 11 and under the general authorization in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.238 Dr. Zuk settled with EPPI for $6,250 in fees, and the attorney
appealed.239
The Third Circuit held that the trial court did not err in making an award of
fees under Section 505 to the prevailing party because this was the kind of case
in which an award is justified.240 It then stated that “under the statutory
directive, the attorney’s fee is considered an element of costs and therefore
liability attached only to Dr. Zuk [the party] and not his attorney . . . . Dr. Zuk
has settled his liability, and the appellant’s [Dr. Zuk’s attorney] liability under
the Copyright Act should not detain us. There is none.”241 In other words, the
fee award under the Copyright Act goes against the party as an element of costs,
and the liability of the party’s attorney for a portion of those fees had to be
justified under different authority. The Court of Appeals turned to the
attorney’s possible liability under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and determined
that meaningful review was impossible because the trial court had failed to
explain what part of the award was based on Rule 11 and what was attributable
to the perceived violation of section 1927.242
Even though the Court of Appeals vacated the award, it addressed the
proper type and amount of sanctions to be awarded pursuant to Rule 11.243 It
said that there was no error in imposing sanctions because the lawyer (1) had
not conducted a reasonable factual investigation prior to filing the suit and thus
violated his duties under Rule 11(b)(3),244 and (2) his inquiry into basic
copyright fundamentals was so weak as to cause him to pursue a course of
conduct not warranted by existing law in violation of his obligations under Rule
11(b)(2).245
Id. at 297 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
Id. at 296–97.
240 Id. at 297.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 298.
243 Id. Cf. Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 880–81 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(awarding fees to the prevailing defendant who had warded off a frivolous case to be paid by
plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel under sections 505 and 1927).
244 103 F.3d at 299–300 (holding counsel had not investigated whether the film had been
distributed at all during the three year period prior to filing the suit and the statute of limitations
problem was obvious).
245 Id. at 300. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine whether the specific
sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney were contrary to the spirit of Rule 11. Id. at 301. In
short, the award of sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney under Rule 11 was affirmed but
vacated as to the type and amount of sanctions imposed under the Rule and under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. The Third Circuit noted that monetary awards under Rule 11 are not encouraged, but
238
239
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Explaining the exercise of discretion: These “overlap cases” show that
the kind of misconduct which justifies an award of fees under Section 505 of
the Copyright Act might also justify fee shifting under Rule 11 or section 1927.
The courts have also noted that fee awards under these provisions are
discretionary, and that this discretion can be abused.246 Accordingly, another
principle is that the trial court has to provide a sufficient explanation for its
exercise of discretion. It has to be clear in explaining its rationale for the award
of fees. For example, in Burger-Moss v. Steinman the plaintiff consented to
summary judgement for the defendants on the ground that it could not prove
that defendants had access to its copyrighted work.247 The defendants sought
sanctions because the plaintiff should have withdrawn its claim early in the
litigation after facts were uncovered which made it clear that access could not
be established.248 The court granted the motion against plaintiff’s counsel
explaining that he put the defendants to three years of effort and expense
defending the baseless claims and had thus vexatiously multiplied the
proceeding to warrant fees under section 1927.249 In addition, the Court said
there had been a clear violation of Rule 11.250
In 16 Casa Duse, LLC. v. Merkin, the Second Circuit held that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in holding the plaintiff and its attorney jointly and
severally liable for costs and attorney’s fees under both section 1927 and section
505 of the Copyright Act.251 The lawyer had argued that the Copyright Act
allows for the imposition of fees only against a party, not a party’s attorney, but
the appellate court noted that the trial court awarded the fees under “both the
Copyright Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The latter statute allows a court to require
an attorney to ‘satisfy personally’ costs and fees. . . . The district court’s
allocation of costs and fees was not contrary to law.”252
The Ninth Circuit has stated that a trial court’s decision to impose sanctions
in reliance on Section 1927 or its inherent authority requires the court to
they are not forbidden either. Id. (quoting Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) (the Court of Appeals told the lower courts that fee shifting is
one of several methods of achieving the goals of Rule 11 and that alternative sanctions should be
considered to adequately deter undesirable behavior)).
246 Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). When this opinion was
issued sanctions under Rule 11 were mandatory. The 1993 revisions changed this to a ‘may’
impose sanctions Rule. See Rule 11(c)(1).
247 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
248 Id.; see also supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
249 127 F.R.D. at 453.
250 Id.
251 791 F.3d 247, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2015).
252 Id. at 264.
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articulate separately the grounds for the sanction so as to assure that the
conduct at issue falls within the scope of the sanctions remedy.253 To impose
sanctions under inherent authority the court has to “make an explicit finding
that counsel’s conduct ‘constituted, or was tantamount, to bad faith.’ ”254 In
other words, it has to be able to explain how counsel committed misconduct in
an unreasonable and vexatious manner that violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927,255 or how
it constituted the kind of bad faith that comes under the court’s inherent
authority to sanction.256 When a court turns to section 1927 to require
opposing counsel to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees it needs to explain its
reasoning or it will risk being overturned for lacking analysis.257
V. CONCLUSION
Many cases in which attorney’s fees are awarded under section 505 will not
support an award of fees under Rule 11, section 1927 or inherent authority.
However, in those instances in which a court can conclude that a plaintiff’s
copyright claim is frivolous or objectively unreasonable to justify a fee award
under Section 505, there often will be significant overlap with the standard
justifications for awarding fees under Rule 11, section 1927, and sometimes
under inherent authority. In these “overlap cases,” if the prevailing party and
the court want to punish and deter opposing counsel instead of visiting his or
her sins on the plaintiff, then it would be appropriate to turn to Rule 11 and its
provisions on sanctions, or to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, to justify the fee award instead
of relying on Section 505 of the Copyright Act. Moreover, if the misconduct is
serious enough the court might be able turn to Rule 11, Section 1927 or
inherent powers along with Section 505 to hold the losing counsel and his or
her client jointly and severally liable for attorney’s fees and costs.258

Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002).
Primus Auto. Fin. Serv. Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997).
255 BKB v. Maui Police Department, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
256 Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2001).
257 Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); cf. Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC,
2016 Copyright Law Decisions ¶ 30,986 at 48,951 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (the award of attorney’s fees
against the plaintiff was justified under Section 505 but the plaintiff’s counsel could not be
sanctioned under the court’s inherent power because although his claims lacked a colorable basis,
they were not made in bad faith). See also Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d
Cir. 1986) (remand ordered because the record gave the appellate court no basis for reviewing the
trial court’s exercise of discretion under the Copyright Act and Rule 11).
258 See, e.g., Burger-Moss v. Steinman, 127 F.R.D. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Fharmacy Records
v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
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